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Abstract
Recently, Yang and Tan proposed a certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing,
and claimed their scheme satisfies forward secrecy, which means no adversary could derive an
already-established session key unless the full user secret keys (including a private key and an
ephemeral secret key) of both communication parties are compromised. However, in this paper,
we point out their protocol is actually not secure as claimed by presenting an attack launched by
an adversary who has learned the private key of one party and the ephemeral secret key of the
other, but not the full user secret keys of both parties. Furthermore, to make up this flaw, we also
provide an improved protocol in which the private key and the ephemeral secret key are closely
intertwined with each other for generating the session key, thus above attack can be efficiently
resisted.
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1. Introduction
In traditional public key cryptography (PKC), a trust certification authority (CA) signs a digital
certificate of a user, and the public key infrastructure (PKI) manages the certificate to provide the
authenticity of public keys. However, certificate management, including distribution, revocation,
storage and validation cost, should face many challenges in practice [1]. To resolve the problem
of certificate management, identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) was proposed by
Shamir [2] in 1984. Its basic idea is that the users can choose arbitrary strings, such as their email
addresses or other online identifies, as their public keys, and the corresponding private keys are
created by binding the identities with a master key of a trusted private key generator (PKG). In
this case, there is no need for certification, but a new question came out. KGC is needed to make
the private key for every user according to his identity, which means it can get all the users’ secret
keys. Thus, ID-PKC has to confront so-called key escrow problem. In order to eliminate the
drawbacks of both ID-PKC and PKI, a new paradigm of certificateless public key cryptography
(CL-PKC) was provided by Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] in 2003. The basic idea of CL-PKC
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is the construct of private key which is combining a partial private key generated by the KGC
with some secret value chosen by himself. Obviously, the CL-PKC is more interesting as which
received both benefits of the ID-PKC and traditional PKI. Thus, CL-PKC is often considered as
a cross between PKI and ID-PKC.
Key exchange (KE) protocols are mechanisms which establish a shared key by two or more
parities communicating over an insecure network. However, compared with the certificateless
encryption and signature [4-13], the study of key exchange protocol based on CL-PKC is seldom
discussed. Al-Riyam and Paterson [3] proposed the first certificateless key exchange protocol
which had no formal security model and proof. Later, some certificateless key exchange (CL-
KE) protocols [1,14,15] were proposed with heuristic key security analysis. Then, Swanson
[16] gave the general security analysis to the proposed certificateless key exchange protocols.
However, all of certificateless key exchange protocols above are based on the bilinear pairings.
Compared with the exponentiations, the computation of pairing is extremely expensive, so the
certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing based on the CL-PKC were proposed by
Geng and Hou [17,18]. Unfortunately, none of these protocols is secure [19]. Recently, Yang
and Tan [20] proposed a new CL-KE protocol without pairing and claimed that their scheme is
strongly secure to their security model.
In this paper, we point out that Yang and Tan’s protocol is actually not secure as claimed by
presenting an attack launched by an adversary who has learned the private key of one party and
the ephemeral secret key of the other, but not the full user secret keys of both parties. That
is, the adversary can make a RevealEphemeralKey(A,i) query to learn the ephemeral secret key
eA of one communication party A and make a RevealSecretValue(B) query to learn the private
key S B of the corresponding party B, and successfully calculates the session key, which means
that the forward secrecy is not satisfied. Furthermore, to make up this flaw, we also provide an
improved protocol in which the private key and the ephemeral secret key are closely intertwined
with each other for generating the session key. In other words, we add z8 = g(eB+zB)(eA+S A+zA) and
z9 = g(S A+eA)(S B+eB) into the generated session key, such that any adversary can calculate neither
z8 nor z9 even if he knows the values of eA and S B. Thus, the session key can not be computed
and the protocol what we improved can effective avoid the attacks mentioned above.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we list the certificateless key
exchange protocol and its security model. In section 3, we review Yang and Tan’s strongly
secure certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing. In section 4, we give our attacks
on Yang and Tan’s scheme as well as a possible improvement . We give some further security
discussions in section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6.
2. Certificateless key exchange and its security model
2.1. Certificateless key exchange
A CL-KE protocol is specified by the following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms:
Setup (1k). This algorithm takes a security parameter k as input and returns the master secret
key msk and the master public key mpk.
ExtractIdBasedKey(msk, ID). This algorithm takes master key msk and a user’s identity ID
as input, and returns a partial private key DID corresponding to the user.
SetSecretValue(mpk, ID). This algorithm takes the master public key mpk and a user’s iden-
tity ID as input, and returns secret value S ID corresponding to the user.
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SetPublicKey(mpk, DID, S ID). This algorithm takes the master public key mpk, a user’s the
secret values S ID as input, and returns a public key pkID corresponding to the user.
SetPrivateKey(mpk, DID, S ID). This algorithm takes a master public key mpk, a user’s partial
private key DID and a secret value S ID as input, and returns a full private key skID corresponding
to the user.
2.2. Adversarial model
In CL-KE protocol as defined in [1], the adversarial model is defined via a game between an
adversary A and a game simulator S. At first, S runs the setup algorithm to generate (mpk, msk)
and returns mpk to A. Then A can deliver, drop, modify or inject messages for he can control
all the network. Furthermore, A may ask a polynomial number of the following queries:
CreateUser (ID). By this query, the adversary A sets up a new user with identity ID. Upon
receiving such a query, S generates DID, S ID, pkID and skID, returns pkID to A.
Send(U, i, m). By this query, the adversary A input the message m to instance ∏iU .
∏i
U
executes protocol and returns the output message Mout to A.
RevealMasterKey(U). This query allows A to obtain the msk.
RevealIDBasedKey(U). This query allows A to learn the DU .
RevealSecretValue(U). This query allows A to obtain the S U .
RevealSecretKey(U). This query allows A to learn the skU .
RevealEphemeralKey(U, i). This query allows A to obtain the ephemeral secret key gener-
ated by∏iU .
RevealSessionKey(U, i). This query allows A to learn the session key sskiU if
∏i
U accepted;
otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
ReplacePublicKey(U, (pkU)′). This query allows A to replace U ′s public key with pkU =
(pkU)′. After this query, S will use the new key pair as U ′s public \ private key pair.
Test(U∗, i∗). This query allows A to select a challenge instance∏iU that has accepted. Upon
receiving this query, a random coin b is flipped by S . If the coin b = 1, then S return sski∗U∗ to
A. Otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space and returned to the
adversary. This query is only made once by A during the game, and ∏i∗U∗ must have accepted
the conversation, and is fresh (defined blow).
At the end of the game, the adversary A outputs a bit b′ as her guess for b. The advantage of
A winning the game is defined as Advclke
A
(k) = 2Pr[b′ = b] − 1.
As an instance
∏i
U uses both long-term key pair ((IDU , pkU), skU) and ephemeral key pair
(epkU , eskU), once both the skU and eskU are exposed, the adversary can trivially compute the
session key sskiU . The instance
∏i
U is safe if none of the conditions is true:
(1) The adversary makes a RevealSessionKey(U, i) query.
(2) The adversary makes both RevealSecretKey(U) and RevealEphemeralKey(U, i) queries.
(3) The adversary makes RevealMasterKey query or RevealIDBasedKey(U) query, and also
makes both RevealSecretValue(U) query and RevealEphemeralKey(U, i) queries.
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(4) ∏iU uses a public/private key pair which is different from its original key pair, and the
adversary makes RevealMasterKey query or RevealIDBasedKey(U) query, and also makes a
RevealEphemeralKey(U, i) query.
Definition1. Session Freshness
Let
∏i
U denote an instance with acciU = ture and pidiU = V . If any of the following conditions
is true, the
∏i
U is unfresh.
(1)∏iU is exposed.
(2)∏iU has a partner instance
∏ j
v, and
∏ j
v is exposed.
(3) If the∏iU has no partner instance, and either of the following cases happens:
(a) the adversary makes RevealMasterKey query or RevealIDBasedKey(V) query, and
makes a RevealSecretValue(V) query;
(b) the adversary makes a RevealSecretKey (V) query;
(c) the adversary makes RevealMasterKey query or RevealIDBasedKey(V) query, and
makes a ReplacePK(V, U, i) query\request.
Definition2. A CL-KE protocol is said to be secure if
(1) in the presence of a benign adversary who only faithfully conveys messages, then two
instances output the same session key;
(2) for any PPT adversary, Advclke
A
(k) is negligible.
Definition3. Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy means that learning the full user secret key should not allow an adversary to
derive an already-established session key.
3. Review of Yang and Tan’s CL-KE proocol
Yang and Tan’s certificateless key exchange protocol without pairing [20] consists of six algo-
rithms: Setup, ExtractIdBasedKey, SetSecretValue, SetPublicKey, SetPrivateKey and Key
Exchange. which is described as follows:
Let DS = {KG, S ig, Ver} denote a digital signature scheme that is unforgeable under adaptive
chosen-message attack [21].
Setup (1k) . KGC chooses a cyclic group G of prime order q, and picks a random number x ∈
Zq, and g ∈ G \ {1}, and computes gx = y . Then, KGC runs the key generation algorithm of DS
to generate a signature/verfication key pairing (sk, vk). At last, KGC sets msk = (x, sk), mpk =
(y, vk).
ExtractIdBasedKey(msk, ID) . Given an identity ID, KGC picks a random number a ∈ Zq,
computes RID = ga, zID = a + H1(ID||RID)x mod q, generates a signature δID = S ig(sk, ID||RID)
and sets DID = (RID, δID, zID).
SetSecretValue(mpk, ID) . The user with identity ID randomly selects t ∈ Zq, and sets S ID =
t.
SetPublicKey(mpk, DID, S ID) . Given the user’s secret value S ID), and ID-Based Key DID,
the user computes UID = gS ID , and sets pkID = (UID, RID, δID).
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SetPrivateKey(mpk, DID, S ID) . Given the user’s public key mpk, secret value S ID) and ID-
Based Key DID, the user sets skID = (DID, S ID).
Key Exchange . To establish a session key, party A and party B exchange the following
messages.
A → B : IDA, pkA, EA = geA ;
B → A : IDB, pkB, EB = geB ,
where eA ∈ Zq, eB ∈ Zq are randomly selected by A and B respectively.
The computation of the session key between A and B is as follows:
Party A: compute
Z1 = EeAB , Z2 = U
S A
B , Z3 = (RBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))zA , Z4 = UeAB ,
Z5 = ES AB , Z6 = (EBRBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))eA+zA ,
Z7 = (UBRBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))S A+zA .
and output the session key as
ssk = H2(sid, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7),
where sid = IDA, IDB, pkA, EA, pkB, EB.
Party B: compute
Z1 = EeBA , Z2 = U
S B
A , Z3 = (RAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))zB , Z4 = UeBA ,
Z5 = ES BA , Z6 = (EARAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))eB+zB ,
Z7 = (UARAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))S B+zB .
and output the session key as
ssk = H2(sid, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7),
where sid = IDA, IDB, pkA, EA, pkB, EB.
4. Analysis and improvement of Yang and Tan’s protocol
Yang and Tan [20] claimed that their protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model,
including the forward secrecy. That is, if an attacker does not know all of (DA, S A, eskA), or all
of (DB, S B, eskB), it is unable for the attacker to derive the session key. However, in this section,
we disprove their result by giving concrete attacks, and propose an improved scheme to prevent
these attacks.
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4.1. Attack
For this protocol, to derive a session key, an adversary can first make two RevealExtractID-
BasedKey queries to learn zA and zB, then make a RevealSecretValue(B) query to learn S B and
make a RevealEphemeralKey(A, i) query to learn eA. Obviously, the adversary learns neither S A
nor eB, which satisfy the requirements and Yang and Tan’s security model. However, the adver-
sary can also compute the session key. To attack this protocol, the adversary might perform the
following steps.
First, the adversary can compute as follows
Z1 = EeAB ,
Z3 = (RBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))zA ,
Z4 = UeAB ,
Z6 = (EBRBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))eA+zA .
As the adversary can not make a RevealSecretValue(A) query, he can not obtain the value of
S A, then should not compute the Z2, Z5 and Z7.
However, as to party B, the adversary does not obtain the value of eB, but learns S B and zB,
and can compute
Z2 = US BA ,
Z5 = ES BA ,
Z7 = (UARAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))S B+zB .
It is easy to see that adversary can really derive the session key as
ssk = H2(sid, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7),
where sid = IDA, IDB, pkA, EA, pkB, EB.
The adversary can successfully calculate the session key associated with the calculation be-
tween part A and party B, which is completely independent and symmetrical.
4.2. Our improved scheme
From the analysis in the previous section, we can see that the insecurity of Yang and Tan’s
protocol is due to the independent of the ephemeral key eA, eB and the ID-based key zA, zB , the
eA, eB and zA, zB are not fully intertwined enough. In the following, we do a slight modification
on Yang and Tan’s protocol, and show a new CL-KE protocol without pairing which can resist
the attack mentioned above. Our improvement is as follows.
Setup, ExtractIdBasedKey, SetSecretValue, SetPublicKey and SetPrivateKey are the same
as those in section 3.
Key Exchange
To establish a session key, party A and party B exchange the following messages.
A → B : IDA, pkA, EA = geA ;
B → A : IDB, pkB, EB = geB ,
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where eA ∈ Zq, eB ∈ Zq are randomly selected by A and B respectively.
The computation of the session key between A and B is as follows:
Party A: compute
Z1 = EeAB , Z2 = U
S A
B , Z3 = (RBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))zA , Z4 = UeAB ,
Z5 = ES AB , Z6 = (EBRBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))eA+zA ,
Z7 = (UBRBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))S A+zA ,
Z8 = (EBRBmpkH1(IDB ||RB))S A+zA+eA , Z9 = (UBEB)S A+eA .
and output the session key as
ssk = H2(sid, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8, Z9),
where sid = IDA, IDB, pkA, EA, pkB, EB.
Party B: compute
Z1 = EeBA , Z2 = U
S B
A , Z3 = (RAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))zB , Z4 = UeBA ,
Z5 = ES BA , Z6 = (EARAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))eB+zB ,
Z7 = (UARAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))S B+zB ,
Z8 = (EAUARAmpkH1(IDA ||RA))eB+zB , Z9 = (UAEA)S B+eB .
and output the session key as
ssk = H2(sid, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8, Z9),
where sid = IDA, IDB, pkA, EA, pkB, EB.
5. Security discussion
In this section, we will analyze the security of the improved protocol, and show that it can
work correctly. Since our protocol is derived from Yang and Tan’s protocol but made appropriate
modification, it can achieve forward secrecy. Through analysis of the protocol, we show that the
protocol can withstand some known attacks, for example, public key replacement attack.
1) known- key secrecy
Even if the session key is compromised, the adversary does not compromise past or future
sessions, as short-term keys are used in generating session keys. Even the two participants of the
protocol remain the same, it also generate different session keys.
2) Forward secrecy
Even if the long-term private key is compromised, the adversary does not reveal previously
established session keys. Even the adversary obtain the value of eA and S B, he can calculate
neither of z8 and z9, that is, he can not compute the session key, so this protocol can achieve the
perfect forward secrecy.
3) PKG forward secrecy
The big advantage of the CL-PKC is no-escrow. Even the PKG’s master private key is compro-
mised, the adversary (including the PKG) can not reveal previously established session keys. The
adversary may generate partial private key, however, in order to compute the established key, the
adversary should also obtain both the value of a short-term private key and the full (long-term)
private key.
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4) unknown key-share resilience
The aim of this attack is to make one participant believe a key which is shared with another
participant, and force the two participants to share the same secret. However, the two participants
can never share the same key, for they should use the identifier of the intended peer when they
compute the session key.
5) key-compromise impersonation
Key-compromise impersonation has no work in our proposed protocol. Arming with the pri-
vate key of A, an adversary can impersonate B to A, however, he can not compute the value of
z7 without knowing the private key of B.
6) known session-specific information security
If the short-term private is compromised, it also does not reveal the established key. Specifi-
cally, even an adversary obtains the values of zA and zB in any session between A and B, he can
not compute z7, z8.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, by giving a concrete attack, we have indicated that Yang and Tan’s CL-KE
protocol without pairing is not secure under their security model. We have also presented an
improvement to prevent the attack and given some further security discussions.
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